Not So Fast, But All Too Furious
May 14, 2014
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO -- A war between the United States and Mexico thought to have ended 130 years ago continues on. Instead of fighting against each other, however, the two nations fight a common enemy, the drug cartels. The problems and instability created by the drug cartels have plagued political leaders in both countries for decades drawing international attention. US Presidents since Bill Clinton have attempted but failed to curb the steady stream of drugs coming north along with quelling the flow of illegal immigrants. This failure to address the movement northwards has resulted in a drug war drawing in state actors and non-state actors alike. Drug related violence is rampant throughout Mexico, especially in the states of Chihuahua and Nuevo Leon, bordering Texas and New Mexico. Both are hot beds for drug related and organized crime related murder.
There have been suggestions that drug cartels should be classified as terrorist organizations. While this may seem farfetched to some, for others it seems a fair label. Regardless, cartels are a reality for those living in Mexico and the Southern United States. Arguably, they are the result of weak governance, so it should come as no surprise that violence increased during an era in which the average economic growth of Mexico was the lowest in the past four administrations. This has resulted in an era noted as the largest escalation of violence in the Mexican Drug War. Though violence has stabilized, it remains a real threat. Policy can no longer look at the macro-leveled problem, but must look at the micro-leveled influences that accompany them as well. Dealing with new and emerging cartel groups that have fragmented from the major cartel groups, developing ways to encourage farmers to not support drug cartels, and re-establishing good governance in the region are issues that the Mexican government must address in order to revert such calamity. This is no longer a domestic Mexican problem, nor is it a US-Mexican problem either. The Mexican Drug War stretches to a global level and cannot be fixed with one single piece of legislation, but requires a multi-national approach from both state and non-state actors alike.
Both nations have been actively involved in operations against the cartels. In the United States, the FBI and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) have taken on the responsibility of securing the US border and repelling drug cartels while the Mexican government and police forces have been fighting the violence onset by drug cartels to the south. On both sides, however, there is growing discontent by civilians on both sides at the lack of progress, resulting in the emergence of vigilante groups that have begun to take the fight against cartels into their own hands.
The movement of narcotics across the border has occurred ever since the establishment of the US-Mexico border. Cocaine started flowing from Mexico to the United States in the 1970s followed by marijuana in the 1990s, with Mexican organized crime groups profiting handsomely ever since. Drug trafficking is a business, and the cartels are dedicated towards improving their profit margins, most notably, by removing the middleman in cultivation, production, and transport.
Violence in Mexico increased significantly in 2006 due to three reasons scholars argue: exogenous changes in the narcotics market; the increased fragmentation of drug cartels into smaller factions; and militarized offensives against drug trafficking commenced under President Felipe Calderon. There seems to be a decreasing trend in violence and homicides in Mexico related to organized crime, with the level of violence finally stabilizing in 2012 after a six year trend of increasing violence. Looking beyond the macro-leveled perspectives of a national campaign, organized crime in specific regions continue to increase, a perspective often diminished and overlooked by policymakers. Scholars in security studies have argued that weak states allow for non-state actors to challenge state power, and with the Mexican government unable to assert state control or a sense of good governance for years, cartels continue to grow in strength. With Mexico being the largest supplier of illegal narcotics, the Mexican government is in a difficult and complex position where they can only continue fighting against the drug trade and cartels with its extremely limited resources and human capital, making the number of options they have limited. With such high profit margins, it is no surprise that intense and violent competition exists between cartels for the vital and lucrative smuggling corridors to the north.
Cartels have taken to cultivating and smuggling a variety of drugs, from marijuana to methamphetamine (yes, Breaking Bad was not joking about this when Walter White encountered the drug cartels and Jesse Pinkman nearly ended up working for them). The most important drug when examining the transnational behaviour of the cartels, however, is cocaine.
Processing cocaine is a relatively simple process. “Once the leaves of the coca plant are harvested, they are rendered into what is known as coca paste. From there, the coca paste is processed into cocaine base, which eventually becomes cocaine hydrochloride. The process involves several precursor chemicals: kerosene, sulfuric acid, sodium carbonate, hydrochloric acid, potassium permanganate and acetone. Most of these chemicals are readily available and easily replaced or substituted, making them difficult for authorities to regulate.” Farmers are paid $1.30 - $3.00 USD per kilogram of coca leaf; it takes between 460- 600 kilograms to produce 1 kilogram of cocaine base. In other words, it costs between $585 and $780 to purchase enough coca leaf to produce a kilogram of cocaine base. Prices within Colombia range from $2200 to $7000 and between $12,000 and $16,000 in Mexico; in the United States it ranges between $24,000 and $27,000 per kilogram. Prices grow even higher in Europe ($53,000 to $55,000 per kilogram) and over $200,000 per kilogram in Australia. Retail prices for produced cocaine range between $100- $500 per gram, depending on where the cocaine is purchased. Furthermore, there is significant “cutting” in the supply chain where substances are added to dilute the cocaine. The 2012 UN World Drug Report suggests the purity is dropped to 30 percent by the time it reaches retail in the United Kingdom. This economic ladder together contributes an estimated $300 billion USD to the lucrative drug industry.
There have been suggestions that drug cartels should be classified as terrorist organizations. While this may seem farfetched to some, for others it seems a fair label. Regardless, cartels are a reality for those living in Mexico and the Southern United States. Arguably, they are the result of weak governance, so it should come as no surprise that violence increased during an era in which the average economic growth of Mexico was the lowest in the past four administrations. This has resulted in an era noted as the largest escalation of violence in the Mexican Drug War. Though violence has stabilized, it remains a real threat. Policy can no longer look at the macro-leveled problem, but must look at the micro-leveled influences that accompany them as well. Dealing with new and emerging cartel groups that have fragmented from the major cartel groups, developing ways to encourage farmers to not support drug cartels, and re-establishing good governance in the region are issues that the Mexican government must address in order to revert such calamity. This is no longer a domestic Mexican problem, nor is it a US-Mexican problem either. The Mexican Drug War stretches to a global level and cannot be fixed with one single piece of legislation, but requires a multi-national approach from both state and non-state actors alike.
